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Resonant-Tunnelling Diodes as PUF
Building Blocks
Ibrahim Ethem Bagci, Thomas McGrath,
Christine Barthelmes, Scott Dean,
Ramo´n Bernardo Gavito, Robert James Young,
and Utz Roedig
Abstract—Resonant-Tunnelling Diodes (RTDs) have been proposed as
building blocks for Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In this paper
we show how the unique RTD current-voltage (I-V) spectrum can be
translated into a robust digital representation. We analyse 130 devices
and show that RTDs are a viable PUF building block.
Index Terms—Physical Unclonable Functions, Identification, Authenti-
cation, Physical Security
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide an alterna-
tive method to generate a secret. Instead of storing the secret
in digital memory or asking a user to provide it, it is derived
from a physical characteristic. A PUF can be constructed in
various ways, for example, using scattering patterns of an
optical medium [1] or chip-specific transistor switch delay
variations [2]. The assumption is that the secret cannot be
duplicated, as it is bound to a physical entity, which cannot
be cloned.
RTDs, simple electronic structures utilising quantum con-
finement, have been proposed as building blocks for PUFs [3].
The RTD encapsulates a quantum nanostructure between two
electrical contacts and displays an exotic I-V characteristic not
seen in classical devices. The I-V spectrum exhibits a peak
which is highly dependent on the quantum confinement within
its nanostructure, and the quantum confinement depends on
the overall atomic arrangement of the device. The atomic
arrangement is subject to random process variations during
manufacture. Therefore, each manufactured device exhibits a
spectrum with a uniquely positioned peak. The peak location
can be translated into unique device specific data.
An RTD has a number of benefits. It represents a physical
system which is extremely hard to clone due to the devices
nanoscale size and complexity. An RTD can be produced
together with an Integrated Circuit (IC) on the same wafer
without introducing additional manufacturing steps. As an
RTD is simple and small in size many can be included within a
chip providing a large amount of unique data. Electronic PUFs
typically suffer from stability issues when implemented and
sensitivity to ambient conditions, this will make scaling the
technology challenging as the feature size in CMOS transis-
tors continues to shrink. PUFs based on quantum tunnelling,
however, have the opposite relation. As the characteristic size
of features within them reduces then measurements from them
become more robust; variations in the resonant voltage vary
• I. E. Bagci is with the School of Computing and Communications,
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK (e-mail: i.bagci@lancaster.ac.uk).
• T. McGrath, C. Barthelmes, S. Dean, R. Bernardo Gavito and R. J. Young
are with the Physics Department, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK (e-
mail: thomas.mcgrath@lancaster.ac.uk; c.barthelmes@lancaster.ac.uk;
scott-dean@outlook.com; r.bernardogavito1@lancaster.ac.uk;
r.j.young@lancaster.ac.uk).
• U. Roedig is with the School of Computer Science and Infor-
mation Technology, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland (e-mail:
u.roedig@cs.ucc.ie).
proportionally to fluctuations in the well’s width with an
inverse square relation.
The general design of RTDs was shown in [3]. Our previous
work focuses on the physical properties of the RTDs. A com-
prehensive discussion on how to obtain data from the RTD and
an evaluation of data quality in a PUF context is missing. In
this paper we investigate in detail how the RTDs can be used
to form a PUF. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are:
• Randomness and Stability: We analyse the randomness
and stability of the RTD spectra by evaluating 130 newly
manufactured devices.
• Digitisation: We show how an RTD measured spectrum
can be digitised. We propose to extract a single bit from
each device by comparing spectrum peak to a threshold.
• Entropy: We analyse the min-entropy of RTD digital
outputs. We show that the entropy depends on accuracy
of the selected threshold.
• Robustness: We investigate robustness of the RTD digital
outputs by analysis of error rates.
In the next section we give an introduction to PUFs and
discuss related work. Section 3 describes the process of digiti-
sation of a measured RTD spectrum. Section 4 analyses the min-
entropy and robustness of the RTDs digital outputs. Section 5
discusses the results and implementation aspects of RTDs.
Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion on future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
It has been shown that process variations exist in ICs [4], [5],
[6], and these variations can be used to extract unique numbers
to identify ICs [7]. Since the identification information can be
read by an attacker easily from the IC, this technique cannot
be used for authentication. To securely authenticate the device
PUFs are proposed [8].
A PUF is a device that uses the physical characteristics
of an IC to generate a secret. We can describe a PUF as a
function, which takes an input challenge c and gives a response
r = f(c) in return. The response is dependant on the physical
characteristic of the IC and the challenge c.
Various methods have been proposed to construct a PUF.
Optical PUFs use the scattering patterns from an optical
medium [1]. Arbiter PUFs use gate delays [9], and some of the
PUFs fabricated on silicon use ring oscillators [10] or statistical
delay variations between two identical paths [2]. SRAM-PUFs
exploit the power-up state of SRAM cells [11], [12]. Rowham-
mer PUFs use the Rowhammer effect in DRAM modules [13].
Coating PUFs use a passive dielectric coating sprayed on the
chip to explicitly introduce random elements [14]. BoardPUFs
characterise the Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) by embedding a
number of capacitors in the internal layers of PCBs and analyse
their variations [15].
Supporting a large number of challenge response pairs
(CRPs) requires a dedicated on-line database where the CRPs
can be stored. When authentication is needed, a challenge from
the database is taken and sent to the PUF and then a check is
performed to ensure the response agrees with the one stored in
the database. The number of CRPs is important when describ-
ing the capability of a PUF [16], [17]. Some PUFs provide a CRP
database which scales exponentially and polynomially with the
system size, and some of them have just one CRP. The number
of CRPs is important when considering PUF applications. For
example, a PUF with a large number of CRPs may be used
for low-cost authentication; a PUF with a single CRPs is often
used for secure key generation (called Physically Obfuscated
Key (POK) in this context [18]). Depending on the number of
CRP, different security requirements exist [17].
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Fig. 1: (a) I-V characteristic. (b) An example of bit generation process out of an I-V
spectrum. Number of bins is selected as 2. Bit numbers of 1 and 0 are generated
from voltage and current axes, respectively.
It has been shown that existing PUFs are often clonable.
A device can be produced which has identical characteristics,
defeating the purpose of a PUF. For example, an SRAM-
PUF was cloned by Helfmeier et al. [19], and it has been
shown that some PUFs have vulnerabilities to side-channel
attacks [20]. However, recent work by Goorden et al. [21] on
random-scattering PUFs makes use of the no-cloning theorem
in quantum mechanics, and prevents the initial challenge to
be cloned. It has also be shown that simulation attacks are
possible where the PUF is replaced by a device producing
the desired output. For example, Arbiter PUFs, Ring Oscillator
PUFs, XOR Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs and Feed-
Forward Arbiter PUFs have all been attacked by Ru¨hrmair et
al. using machine learning techniques [22].
The works by Ru¨hrmair et al. [23] and Jaeger et al. [24]
are the closest to ours in terms of the material. As opposed to
previous work, using an RTD as a source of a PUF uses much
less resources and operate with lower power, have a smaller
device geometry and rely on atomic structure, which is the most
difficult system to attempt to clone.
3 EXTRACTING UNIQUE DATA FROM RTDS
In this work we use RTDs, simple electronic structures
exhibiting quantum confinement [3]. The RTD encapsulates a
quantum nanostructure between two electrical contacts and
displays an exotic I-V characteristic not seen in classical devices.
The I-V spectrum exhibits a peak which is highly dependent
on the quantum confinement within its nanostructure, and
the quantum confinement is subject to the overall atomic ar-
rangement of the device. The atomic arrangement is subject to
random process variations during manufacture. Therefore, each
manufactured device exhibits a spectrum which can be used to
uniquely identify the device.
3.1 Digitisation
The I-V spectrum as shown in Figure 1a has a number
of characteristics which can be considered when transforming
the signal into a digital representation. The obvious choice is
the location and the height of the peak position. However,
it is also possible to consider a number of other elements,
these include the position of the valley (where the current
drops to before rising again), the slope of the curve after the
peak (the negative differential resistance (NDR) region) or the
width of the peak (the full-width half maximum). Furthermore,
unlike a conventional diode, all these features appear in both
bias directions giving us double the number of elements to
explore [25].
We decided in this work to only consider peak position and
height as they are straightforward to characterise. It would be
possible to integrate the RTD with a simple electronic circuit
for peak finding. This would be more efficient than sweeping
over the entire spectrum and then subsequently applying a
computer algorithm for peak finding. However, in this work
we followed this inefficient approach as we used prototype
devices not equipped with dedicated circuitry for peak finding.
The peak finding method used will be explained in Section 3.2.
We can generate a digital output using I or V axes (consid-
ering peak height or location). The axis is divided into 2 bins
within the range in which we expect peaks to be positioned.
Peak ranges are known and depend on the device specifics.
The bin order is used as the bit number that is extracted
from the device. Hence, we extract only one bit from a device.
Increasing the number of bins helps to generate a larger unique
bit sequence, i.e., we can extract more than one bit numbers
from a peak position. However, at the same time this causes
a less robust bit sequence as the peak location/height is then
more likely to fluctuate between quantisation steps for each
measurement as these are subject to noise. Another drawback
of increasing the number of bins is that it may cause bias in the
output. Some of the peak positions may be clustered in some
positions, and the bit sequences from those peaks would be
similar to each other. Furthermore, 2 bins approach is easier to
implement in hardware. Using only 2 bins would divide the
spectrum into 2, and by choosing a proper threshold we can get
a bit number with equal probability. Notice that RTDs are tiny
devices. Therefore, even if we extract only one bit from a device,
many of them can be used together to obtain a bit sequence of
required size while keeping the total size of the interconnected
devices still small.
When we use 2 bins per axis, if the peak position falls into
left half of the voltage axis, we extract bit number 0; or if it
falls into right half of the voltage axis, we extract bit number
1. Similarly, if the peak position is in lower half of the current
axis, we extract bit number 0; or if it is in the upper half of
the current axis, we extract bit number 1. Figure 1b shows an
example of the bit extraction (digitisation) process for a device.
Peak position is shown as a black dot. In this example, we
generate the bits 1 and 0 from the voltage and current axes,
respectively.
It should be noted that there is a dependency between the
peak position on the voltage and current axes. Hence, it might
be advisable to only use one axis at a time to extract digital
information.
3.2 Peak Finding
In this work, RTD spectra are fit to an analytical expression
for the current density of a tunnel diode as a function of volt-
age [26]. The fit was found to accurately follow the experimen-
tal results that were obtained, and so the local maximum value
of the equation shown in [26] was used. This corresponds to
the tunnelling region maximum used for the voltage position of
the peak current value as opposed to the raw, recorded voltage
value. This is to take advantage of analysis of all the data points
in the spectrum, as opposed to just the maximum point, leading
to a more accurate representation of actual peak value. It is
worth noting this model does not account for the plateauing
of the current shortly after the peak voltage is reached. These
occurrences are likely due to charge trapping effects of electrons
within the quantum well of the diode. The least squares fit was
therefore applied to the initial incline and only small portion
tunnelling decline, before the current starts to plateau.
The analytic expression in [26] describes the shape of the I-
V curve. However, the curve parameters are determined by the
specifics of the RTD in question. An attacker will therefore be
aware of the shape of a curve (function) but does not have any
information about peak position (function parameters).
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3.3 Threshold Selection
In this work we are dividing the voltage and current axes
into 2 bins by selecting a threshold to extract a bit number
from an RTD. Ideally, the threshold should divide the axes
into two where the number of peaks on the both sides of it
are equal. Device specifics and its physical characteristics can
give an idea about choosing the threshold. Another way to
decide the threshold is to measure a subset of device and get the
mean values of the peak positions. This may not give the true
threshold but we should get an estimation about its location.
The application scenario will determine how many of the
devices can be used to calculate the threshold. If the PUFs will
be used for identification purposes, all the devices must be
profiled during the manufacturing phase so that we can know
the true threshold. This because the identification application
would require comparing the PUF results that are constructed
from RTDs against a database. In this case the threshold would
divide the axes into 2 where in both sides of the threshold there
will be equal amount of peak positions. Therefore, probabilities
of extracting bit numbers 0 and 1 will be 0.5 for each RTD.
In some scenarios, RTDs may be manufactured and shipped
in batches at different times. And sometimes profiling all man-
ufactured RTDs may not be feasible due to their large number.
Therefore, the threshold must be estimated using the first
shipped batch or some portion of the RTDs. Then the outputs of
the remaining devices would be extracted by comparing their
peak positions against the estimated threshold. This will not
guarantee that the number of peaks in both side of the threshold
will be equal.
3.4 Min-Entropy of RTD Outputs
In information theory, the min-entropy corresponds to the
most conservative way of measuring the unpredictability of a
set of outcomes. It allows measurement of the quality of the
results. The goal is to get unpredictable outputs as often as
possible, and in best case it means having min-entropy equal to
the size of the outputs.
Let pmax denote the most likely outcome of random variable
X , then min-entropy of X is defined as:
H∞(X) = Hmin(X) = −log2pmax
In our work, we extract 1 bit from an RTD. In an ideal case,
the probabilities of bit numbers 0 and 1 should be equal, p =
0.5. Therefore, most likely outcome of any bits would be pmax =
0.5, and min-entropy of H∞ = 1 can be obtained from a device
in the best case.
The threshold selection has a crucial impact on the amount
of min-entropy that can be obtained from a device. The highest
min-entropy can be achieved only if the threshold can divide
the axis where the each side of the threshold have equal size of
peaks. With poor threshold selections, the number of peaks will
be different at each side of the threshold, and it will decrease
the min-entropy.
3.5 Concatenation
In this work we extract only 1 bit from an RTD. Therefore,
RTD by itself is not suitable to be used as a PUF. Multiple
RTDs have to be connected to construct a PUF and to obtain
desired amount of bit sequences. The number of RTDs required
for a PUF depends on the min-entropy of a device and on the
desired security level. For example, if min-entropy of H∞ = 0.8
can be obtained from a device, 128÷ 0.8 = 160 RTDs should be
concatenated to get 128 bit level security. Moreover, if an error
correction mechanism is used alongside the PUF, we need more
RTDs as helper data reduces the overall entropy from a PUF.
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Fig. 2: I-V spectrum of 130 devices. (a) One measurement for 130 devices in low
resolution. (b) 10 and 50 measurements for one device in low and high resolution,
respectively.
4 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In the previous section we described how an RTD spectrum
can be digitised. In this section we aim to analyse the quality
of extracted bits. For this purpose we analyse the min-entropy
and the robustness of the outputs.
4.1 Experimental Data
In this work we manufactured and measured 130 RTDs. For
each of the devices, 10 independent measurements are obtained
by sweeping from 0V to 0.5V with 5mV resolution, which
corresponds to 101 voltage points. We will refer these measure-
ments as measurements taken with low resolution. After figuring
out where the peak area is, 50 more independent measurements
are obtained in a 0.05V range around the peak with 0.5mV
resolution, which again corresponds to 101 voltage points. We
will refer these measurements as measurements taken with high
resolution. We use multiple measurements of the same device to
analyse the robustness of the digital output generation process.
It has to be noted that this measurement was carried out in an
experimental setup such that peak position and height can be
evaluated. A practical device would contain electronic circuitry
to directly find peak location and peak height, eliminating some
of the more complex spectrum evaluation steps.
4.2 Spectra Randomness and Stability
In this section we investigate the quality of the RTD spectra
with statistical analysis.
Figure 2a shows the I-V spectrum of first measurement of
each of the 130 devices. As shown in the figure, peak locations
and height in each spectrum differ. Figure 2b shows the I-V
spectrum of 10 and 50 individual measurements of one of the
devices in low and high resolution, respectively. This figure
shows that the spectrum is stable when considering a single
device.
The peak location of an I-V spectrum is found by peak find-
ing method explained in Section 3.2. Peak locations from all the
measurements of each device are shown in Figure 3a. The figure
shows error bars on both voltage and current axes using the
mean and 99% confidence level of the 50 measurements in high
resolution. We can see that even if some of the peak locations
are close to each other, they are still clearly distinguishable.
Next we perform statistical tests to investigate more thor-
oughly how device measurements deviate from each other. To
carry out such a test in a meaningful way it is first necessary
to determine the distribution type of the measurements. We
carry out a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a significance level
of α = 0.01 to check the normality of the peak locations of 130
devices with their 50 measurements in high resolution. This test
concludes that peak locations and height do not fit a normal
distribution. Therefore, we apply a pair-wise Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test to the peak locations to see how they deviate
from each other. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-
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Fig. 3: (a) Peak locations of the I-V spectrum with error bars on both voltage and
current axes, using the mean and 99% confidence level of the 50 measurements
in high resolution. Individual peaks are clearly discernible. (b), (c) p-values when
130 devices are compared to each other with the peak positions in voltage and
current axes, respectively. (d) Ratio of the indistinguishable pairs over the total
pairs with varying significance levels on voltage and current axes, and on both
axes at the same time.
parametric test, which is an alternative to a t-test for non-
normally distributed sets.
We are applying the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with
varying significance levels. The null hypothesis for the test
is that two samples come from the same population, and the
alternative hypothesis is that they do not. The null hypothesis
is rejected if the resulting p-value of the test is less than the
significance level. Figures 3b and 3c show the p-values when
130 devices are compared to each other with the peak positions
in voltage and current axes, respectively. Here we perform
8385 pairwise comparisons. A small p-value indicates strong
evidence against the null hypothesis. Therefore, we should
obtain smaller p-values from the statistical test. In figures 3b
and 3c, small p-values are shown with lighter colours. We can
see that the current axis performs better than the voltage axis.
Figure 3d shows ratio of number of indistinguish-
able pairs over the total pairs with significance levels of
0.001, 0.01, 0, 05 and 0.1. The figure shows the indistinguish-
able pairs for either voltage and current axes, and when they are
indistinguishable on both axes at the same time. We have 17, 9,
4, and 2 pairs when they are indistinguishable on both axes
with significance levels 0.001, 0.01, 0, 05 and 0.1, respectively.
This means that majority of the peak positions are unique.
We also look at the inter-device spectrum stability. We
compare half of the measurements of an RTD to the other half
of the measurements of the same RTD with significance levels
of 0.001, 0.01, 0, 05 and 0.1. If the statistical test rejects the null
hypothesis, it means that the two halves of the same device are
considered as coming from different populations. Out of 130
devices, 2 of them rejected the null hypothesis on voltage axis
and 7 of them rejected on current axis, with each significance
level. However, none of them rejected the null hypothesis on
both axes at the same time.
These results show that RTD spectra are mostly unique
to each device, and remain mostly stable between multiple
measurements.
4.3 Entropy of the RTD Outputs
Section 4.2 shows that the ratio of non-unique peak posi-
tions is very low. However, to be able to use RTDs as a PUF
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Fig. 4: Peak positions averaged from 50 measurements in high resolution of 130
devices.
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Fig. 5: (a) Min-entropy amount when using different numbers of devices for
training. (b) Error rates when using different numbers of devices for training.
source, e.g., for key generation, we need to extract bits from the
devices. Here, we investigate the min-entropy of the outputs of
RTDs.
Ideally, the distribution of the bits extracted from RTDs
should be uniform. As a result, there won’t be any bias on
an output or group of outputs. Uniform distribution of the
outputs will help to get highest entropy from a device, which
will determine the number of RTDs to be used in a PUF for a
specific security level. In this work we generate only one bit
from an RTD, therefore we aim to obtain a min-entropy of 1.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of the peak positions aver-
aged from 50 measurements in high resolution of 130 devices.
Vertical dashed line on the voltage axis and horizontal dashed
line on current axis show the thresholds on the axes that are
calculated from the measured 130 devices. Thresholds divide
the axes into 2 bins, where in each bin there are equal number
of peaks. We can see that the peak positions on both axes
follow close to normal distribution, and the ones on the current
axis are slightly biased to the lower side of the spectrum.
Here, thresholds on the voltage and current axes affect the
distribution of bit numbers 0 and 1 that are extracted from the
devices.
Figure 5a shows the min-entropy result when using differ-
ent number of devices for training, i.e., for finding the threshold
for an axis. We run the test 1000 times to randomly select a
specific percentage of devices for training and average the final
results. Then 50 measurements in high resolution of all devices
are averaged and compared against the estimated threshold.
We can see that increasing the number of devices for train-
ing increases the entropy. Clearly, we obtain a min-entropy
H∞ = 1 if we can use all the devices for training to estimate
the threshold.
4.4 Robustness of the RTD Outputs
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the out-
puts of RTDs. Each I-V spectrum of RTDs is subject to noise,
therefore different measurements of an RTD may have slight
differences.
We evaluate the robustness by calculating the rate of obtain-
ing different bit numbers from a device when it is measured
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at different times, which we call error rate. Devices that give
peak positions far away from the thresholds are less likely to
give different bit numbers from their different measurements.
However, if the peak position of a device is close to the
threshold, each measurement would cause the peak position
to fall either side of the threshold.
We first find the threshold by using the training de-
vices, and average the peak positions of the measurement
of all devices. Then we record which side of the threshold
the averaged peak positions fall. Then we check whether
the peak positions of individual measurements of each de-
vice fall to the same side of the threshold where the cor-
responding device’s averaged peak positions fall. To get
the error rate, number of mismatches are summed for
all test devices and their measurements; and divided by
[Number of test devices]X[Number of measurements].
Figure 5b shows the error rates when using different num-
ber of devices for training. Again, we used 50 measurements
of 130 devices. We repeat the test 1000 times to randomly select
training devices and average the results. Error rate performance
of current axis is better than voltage axis. The number of
training devices does not have much effect on error rates. This is
because the number of peaks around different thresholds, even
if they are estimated with small number of training devices, are
similar to each other (peak positions are not clustered around
the thresholds). The figure also shows the maximum error rate
of all devices and their measurements. We obtain less maximum
error rates when the number of training devices are close to the
number of all devices.
4.5 Improving Error Rates
In Figure 5b, out of 130 devices, 47 devices recorded errors
on voltage axis, 7 devices on the current axis, and 3 devices
on both axes when training with all the devices. One can
disable these RTDs from the final product batch at the time
of provisioning, so that more robust PUFs can be created.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 RTD Performance
We have shown that RTD spectrum is unique to each device,
and remains stable between multiple measurements.
The quality of the digital outputs of RTDs depends on
the accuracy of threshold selection. The threshold is estimated
using a number of training devices. Increasing the number
of training devices while estimating the threshold leads to
higher min-entropy results. The best min-entropy can be ob-
tained when all the devices are used for threshold estimation.
However, the number of training devices does not have much
effect on the average error rates. This is because the error
rate depends on the variance of the peak positions around the
threshold, and these variances are similar over the axes.
We have found that current axis is better option than the
voltage axis. Although the min-entropy results from each axis
are almost the same, peak positions on current axis are more
distinguishable among each device, and more stable between
multiple measurements of a device. Moreover, the error rates
are lower on current axis.
5.2 Attacks
Unclonability: The technology necessary to clone an RTD
requires that the internal atomic structure be recorded with
high precision before being re-assembled, atom by atom, on
a separate chip. State-of-the-art technologies for measuring and
remapping a three-dimensional structure’s atomic make-up are
not sophisticated enough to achieve this [27]. Furthermore,
the attacker would have to destroy the honest party’s RTD
to probe the internal structure and since they cannot make
a clone this would leave the legitimate user aware of some
malpractice. This two-stage process necessary for cloning a
device presents a higher degree of security as even if it became
feasible to achieve one step, the other step would hinder a clone
being produced. Moreover, it is unlikely that the technology
required to complete either stage will not be advanced enough
in the near future. An attacker could measure, approximate and
recreate an RTD’s response, such that the produced signature
agrees with the initial RTD’s within errors. This vulnerability
can be mitigated by using a large number of RTDs in a single
PUF.
Predictablity: Some PUFs providing multiple CRPs have
been attacked using Machine Learning (ML) [22], which can
help to predict a response for a challenge by analysing pre-
viously observed CRPs. This work describes individual RTDs
as PUF elements. ML attacks cannot be run on the individual
RTDs used in this study as the devices are independent. ML
attacks may be possible when integrating many of the described
RTDs into a full PUF device as there might be a hidden
dependency between RTDs due to the manufacturing process.
However, as a full PUF device incorporating many RTDs was
not yet produced for this study, ML analysis is reserved for
future work.
Simulation: An attacker can observe the response(s) of a
PUF and replace it with another device that has the same
response(s). PUFs with a single CRP can prevent this form of
attack by not revealing the response during operation (Internal
processing, potentially in a tamper proof environment). A PUF
with multiple CRPs does not have the same restriction, as
the attacker cannot enumerate all CRPs within a feasible time
frame. However, in this work we have investigated a PUF
building block and not a full device, therefore, this aspect has
not been studied in detail.
5.3 Implementation Aspects
Integration: The RTD devices presented here use standard
III-V semiconductor structures, which are the materials used for
common optoelectronic devices such as laser diodes and LEDs.
However, RTDs can also be made from silicon, the material
of choice in the electronics industry for fabricating components
such as transistors and ICs [28], [29], [30]. The facilities required
for the fabrication of III-V structures and silicon is different, but
these devices can be integrated into any procedure depending
on the architecture wanted on chip. There is also the possibility
of combining both these processes [31]. Furthermore, RTDs can
be fabricated on a large scale due to the ability to integrate a
huge number of devices on one chip. Typically, we can make
approximately 50,000 devices on one 8′′ wafer, and advanced
fabrication facilities have the possibility of making 50 of these
8′′ wafers simultaneously.
Measurement: There is a need for measurement simplicity;
peak location and height should be determined quickly and
without complex measurement procedures. In this study the
spectrum of a device was measured and peaks were determined
later using software. However, in a practical application sce-
nario circuitry for automatic searches would be integrated with
the device.
Temperature Stability: The effects of temperature upon
the resonant tunnel diode within the bounds of any expected
operating temperatures (−50 to 70◦C [32]) are negligible. This
is because the temperature of the quantum well (the active
region) of the RTD becomes practically independent from the
temperature of the surrounds, since the active region of a
resonant tunneling diode in operation is significantly higher
than the temperature outside of the device. Additionally, the
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predictable nature of any variation the diodes may experience
with external temperature can be leveraged to enhance security.
One example case would be including a temperature sensor
and examining variation due to temperature as an additional
verification step, since a simulated component could not as
easily or accurately adjust with temperature compared to the
genuine semiconductor counterpart.
Cost: The ability to use parallel fabrication has transformed
the semiconductor industry, making it possible to make a large
quantity of the same device in a small number of processing
steps. Whereas in other fabrication processes you might have
to make one device at a time, here we can make a huge number
of devices simultaneously. Using RTDs made from silicon as an
example, it is common that 100 silicon wafers with a diameter
of 11′′ would cost approximately $20. Therefore, around 2.5
million devices could be made for less than $10 in terms of cost
of material. The main cost arises from the need for expertise and
running the equipment and machinery necessary. However,
as this many devices can be made in parallel, this cost is
insignificant per device.
Material, Fabrication and Size: The RTDs examined in our
study are formed from a double barrier of Indium Gallium
Arsenide (InGaAs) and Aluminium Arsenide (AlAs) upon an
Indium Phosphide (InP) substrate, with gold (Au) contacts [33].
The material was layered through molecular beam epitaxy,
with top contacts defined by optical lithography and fabricated
using thermal evaporation. Reactive Ion Etching (RIE) and
wet etching was then employed to define the side walls of
the RTD and air-bridge undercut, with the bottom contacts
again thermally evaporated. RTDs can be of variable size and
makeup, and while those studied here are formed of 4µm2
III-V semiconductor material, these devices can meet size and
material requirements for easy integration into typical CMOS
processes [34], as cost evaluated in Section 5.3.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our results show that RTDs can be used to construct a
PUF, which is suitable for secure key generation (with limited
number of CRPs) and low-cost authentication (with exponential
number of CRPs). An RTD represents a physical system which
is extremely hard to clone due to the device’s nanoscale size and
complexity. Additionally, they are simple to mass-manufacture
and easy to operate. We have demonstrated that RTDs can
generate bits which are unique and robust.
In this work we used data from 130 fabricated RTDs. In
future we aim to investigate different ways of constructing
PUFs using RTDs. We plan to produce and analyse a larger
number of improved devices which integrate the measurement
circuitry to enable peak finding.
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